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Transparency in Arbitration Proceedings 
BY: 
AISHANI NARAIN  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Confidentiality, other than flexibility, is the reason why one is drawn towards Arbitration. 
It ensures party autonomy and saves them from unwanted publicity. It is often argued that 
confidentiality compromises the transparency in arbitration proceedings, which is important in 
public interest. 
Sweden, with its decision in Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank v. AI Trade Finance 
Inc,1became the first country to deny confidentiality under the UNECE laws, which do not forbid 
disclosure of arbitration proceedings. Also, under Swedish law, arbitration proceedings are not 
confidential unless the agreement expressly mentions so. A similar observation was made in 
United States v. Panhandle E. Corp.2 
Whereas in G Aita v. A Ojjeh3and Esso Australia Resources Ltd and Ors. v. Plowman 
(Minister for Energy and Minerals) & Ors,4 the principle of implied confidentiality in an 
arbitration proceeding was accepted by the tribunals. 
In the paper, the author endeavors to study transparency in arbitration proceedings. The 
focus is on Investor-State arbitrations. The paper deals with the rules related to transparency under 
 
1 Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank v. Al Trade Finance Inc [NJA][Supreme Court Reports] 2000. T 1881-99 (Swed). 
 
2 681 F. Supp. 229 (D. Del.1988). 
 
31986 Rev. Arb. 583. (Cour d’appel de Paris, 18 février 1986 // or Judgment of 18 Feb. 1986, 1986 Revue DE 
L'ARBITRAGE 583). 
4128 A.L.R 39(1995). 
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the various international institutes such as UNCITRAL (United Nations Convention on 
International Trade Law), ICSID (International Center for Settlement of Investor Disputes), AAA 
(American Arbitration Association), and LCIA (London Court for International Arbitration). The 
paper also tries to analyze the nature of transparency and the scope of power of an Arbitration 
Tribunal with the help of case law. Ultimately, the author hopes to throw light on the viability of 
transparency in an arbitration proceeding. 
A. What is Investor State Dispute Settlement Mechanism? 
As the name suggests, a dispute between a state and a foreign company is an Investor-State 
Dispute. In 1959, Germany and Pakistan were the first to use Investor State Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism when they reached a trade agreement which encouraged and protected investments 
between the two countries. 
Since then, there have been many international treaties that provide redressal of investor 
state dispute through arbitration. Other than the fact the arbitration provides flexibility, it is 
considered a preferred method because it is widely enforceable internationally. 
Thus, the Investor State Dispute Settlement Mechanism is a legal provision that is an 
international agreement. Like Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT), the agreement may be bilateral 
or multilateral. Investor State Dispute Settlement Mechanism may also be present in chapters of 
Free Trade Agreements like General Agreement on Trade Services. It empowers investors with 
the right to international arbitration when a foreign government, which is also a party to the 
agreement, of the foreign government has breached one of its provisions. 
B. What is transparency? 
While dealing with the subject of transparency in arbitration proceedings one must be clear 
on the three concepts: public access, transparency, and disclosure. The three are distinct but related 
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concepts because transparency is commonly defined simply as a synonym for “accountability” or 
“openness.”5 Each of these concepts has its own potential means, benefits, and consequences. 
i. PUBLIC ACCESS 
In the context of adjudication, public access deals with a citizen’s right to attend the 
proceedings. Public access is often considered a part of transparency, but the distinction 
between them is that “public access is linked to the notion of a political community. This 
implication is founded in its structure as an individual right, which presumes enforceability as 
against a political structure.”6 For example, some say  that an Indian citizen has a “right” to 
attend a hearing in the United States for a case between a Chinese and Russian party that is 
governed by German law. Thus, it is important to differentiate concrete and genuine rights from 
general political aims that are not subject to judicial reinforcement. 
ii. TRANSPARENCY 
 
Like the concept of public access, transparency provides the right to attend proceedings 
only to the interested parties. Thus, it has a narrower scope. 
 
iii. DISCLOSURE 
Disclosure obligations, by contrast, are principally directed at substantive information 
and are designed to benefit those receiving the relevant information.7 Disclosed information 
 
5 Dictionary definitions often equate the two. For example, the definition of "transparency" in the online 
encyclopaedia Wikipedia is "as used in the humanities, implies openness, communication, and accountability." 
Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transparency_(humanities), (Last Modified 10/11/2107). 
6 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 93 (Harvard University Press, 2nd part edition. 1977). 
7 David Weil, The Benefits and Costs of Transparency: A Model of Disclosure-Based Regulation, (2002), available 
at: http://ssm.com/abstract-316145 , (Last Modified 10/11/2107) (Weil actually defines disclosure-based regulation 
as a form of transparency, but he is discussing the concepts outside the adjudicatory context, where such distinctions 
are less relevant.). 
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may incidentally constrain the entities making disclosures, but its primary purpose is to enable 
recipients of the information to make strategic choices. 
In order to avoid the courts of the opposite party and resume business dealings, parties 
turned to arbitration. The international commercial arbitration was a compromise-oriented 
process in which “strictly legal considerations [could be] pushed aside for the sake of achieving 
unanimity among the arbitrators and giving something to both parties.”8 The arbitrators crafted 
proceedings on the basis of their professional experiences, and their rulings were based on their 
sense of what was equitable and just instead of formal, transparent rules.  As a result, parties 
have almost no way of knowing the inner workings of the decisional machine. Indeed, with 
confidentiality may come opacity, which may in turn leave room for doubts as to its adequacy. 
The scenario is quite different today. The exponential increase in trade and trade-related 
disputes has resulted in an increased number and diversity of participants in the International 
scenario. As a result, competition and cooperative efforts to improve the system increased 
among institutions, arbitrators, and parties. Collectively, these forces have produced significant 
gains for transparency. 
II. RECENT TRENDS 
Recently, many believe that investment arbitrations lack legitimacy and transparency in 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). Standardization of the transparency rules is important to 
provide access to the public in international dispute settlement proceedings.9 UNCITRAL Rules, 
which address these issues, create a procedure that ensures transparency and accessibility. 
However, these rules lack enforceability. 
The U.N. General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention on Transparency in 
Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration on December 10, 2014, opening the convention for 
signature on March 17, 2015. This convention, also known as the "Mauritius Convention," is the 
 
8 F. A. Mann, The Aminoil Arbitration, 54 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 213, 214 (1983). 
9Gabriele Ruscalla, Transparency in International Arbitration: Any (Concrete) Need to Codify the Standard?, 
Groningn Journal GRONINGEN J. OF INT’L Law, vol. 3(1): Int’l Arbitration and Procedure, 1-26,. L. (2015)), 
https://grojil.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/grojil_vol3-issue1_ruscalla_.pdf. 
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legal instrument by which state parties express their consent to apply the Rules on Transparency 
to investment treaties concluded before April 1, 2014 (including the BIT, under which parties bring 
present arbitration).The Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration10 
(The Mauritius Convention on Transparency) mandates the retrospective application of 
UNCITRAL Rules in bilateral investment treaties and trade agreements with chapters on 
investments. Article (1)1 stipulates: The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based 
Investor-State Arbitration (Rules on Transparency) shall apply to investor-State arbitration 
initiated as per Article 2 and Article 3 of the rules.11 
The UNCITRAL rules mandate that any investment agreement entered into or disputes 
arising from an agreement made on or after April 1, 2014, apply the UNCITRAL Rules on 
transparency. Parties who ratify the Rules on transparency will automatically update all treaty-
based procedural rules governing investor-state arbitration that concluded before April 1, 2014, 
regardless of whether the proceedings take place under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
Furthermore, the convention is mandatory and applies when the states involved are parties to the 
convention.12 As of April 18, 2017, there are three member states that are parties to the convention: 
Switzerland, Canada, and Mauritius. Australia became the first state in Asia Pacific Region to sign 
the Mauritius Convention.13 
Apart from the UNCITRAL Rules, the ICC Rules have also undergone changes to 
accommodate transparency. In January 2016, the ICC announced its new policies to “foster 
transparency and ensure greater efficiency” in the arbitration proceedings it administers. Some 
important features of the rules include the following: 
 
10 United Nations TreatyCommission on International Trade Law, United Nations Convention on Transparency in 
Treaty- Based Investor-state arbitration, Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (Dec. 10, 
2014),https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/transparency-convention/Transparency-Convention-
e.pdf. 
11 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (Rules on Transparency), 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency.html 
12  Erica Duffy, The Mauritius Convention’s Entry Into Force: High Hopes with Little Impact, 
STICHTINGGROENINGEN J. OF INT’L. L. BLOG (May 18. 2017), https://grojil.org/2017/05/18/the-mauritius-
conventions-entry-into-force-high-hopes-with-little-impact/. 
 
13 https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2017/australia/australia-signs-the-mauritius-convention 
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The composition of the tribunal shall be published. In essence, according to the 
ICC’s new measure, the following information for arbitrations started on or after 
January 1, 2016 will be made public: 
• the number of appointments received by Arbitrator X in ICC 
arbitration proceedings; 
• whom Arbitrator X was sitting with and his role in the tribunal (co-
arbitrator or chair); 
• whether Arbitrator X was appointed by the ICC or by the parties; 
• in how many pending ICC arbitration cases Arbitrator X is involved. 
There will be financial consequences for excessive delays in rendering awards for 
arbitrators. 
The new policy applies to all cases registered on or after January 1, 2016. Despite the 
consensus amongst the various nations regarding the need for transparency, they seem hesitant to 
ratify the convention. A possible reason could be the absence of choice when it comes to 
conforming with the transparency standards. 
III. PUBLIC INTEREST 
In some circumstances, arbitration involves public interest concerns. When the public 
interest is involved, it outweighs the interests of the parties in favor of the larger good of the people. 
In an investor-state dispute, public interest can be even more of a concern. The very fact that the 
arbitration is between the state and a foreign company creates a public interest issue. The citizens 
of the party state have an interest and a right to know how their government performs during the 
proceeding and the arbitration’s final outcome. It is also pertinent that investor-state arbitrations 
often involve monetary considerations. The large potential monetary liabilities for public treasuries 
and any award of compensation will affect the state’s budget. Thus, these factors need to be 
considered while making laws on confidentiality. In such a case, partial transparency must be 
maintained.  
IV. PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS 
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In 1993, Ronald Steven Lauder invested in a Czech private television broadcaster through 
his company called Central European Media (CME). CME entered into a joint venture agreement 
with a Czech company called Central European Television 21 (CET 21). Vladimír Železný headed 
the joint venture.  However, in 1999, CME fired Železný. Subsequently, CET21 terminated its 
contract with CME after the latter failed to fulfill its obligations (to submit the daily log regarding 
the broadcasting for the next day) under the JV agreement. 
After the Velvet Revolution (dissolution of Czechoslovakia), the newly formed Czech 
Republic inherited the BIT treaties with the United States and the Netherlands. CME and Lauder, 
respectively, sought damages for the alleged interference of the Czech Media Council, a 
government entity, into the business arrangements between the companies, which allegedly 
eventually resulted in losses to Lauder. Parallel proceedings were initiated under the two bilateral 
investment treaties: USA-CZ treaty (London arbitration)14 and the NL-CZ treaty (Stockholm 
arbitration).15 
The claims made in both cases were similar: both CME and Lauder alleged that the Czech 
Republic had violated the provisions of the investment treaty. The tribunals handed down two 
contradictory arbitral awards even though both tribunals were effectively dealing with the same 
facts. Lauder’s claims in Ronald Lauder v. Czech Republic were dismissed, but CME’s claims 
were upheld. CME was awarded damages of $270 million and 10% interest. Finally, the Czech 
Republic paid $355 million to CME. 
The two claims were so directly and intrinsically linked that the possibility of conflicting 
arbitral awards – and, if so, inconsistent findings – was high. Such conflicting awards and findings 
are extremely controversial, place the respondent in an invidious position, and undermine 
confidence in the system of investment treaty arbitration. 
A. Rules of Transparency—A Norm or an Exception? 
 
14Ronald Lauder v. Czech Republic (Final Award of 3 September 2001), available at: 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0451.pdf. 
15CME Czech Republic BV v. Czech Republic, (Partial Award of 13 September 2001, Final Award of 14 March 
2003, available at: https://www.italaw.com/cases/281. 
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It important to note, in arbitration the award and the hearing are the two most significant 
features of the arbitral process. The entire proceedings are oriented toward these two features. 
In a hearing, the parties lay out the legal, factual, and evidentiary aspects of the dispute, 
which have been developed through the earlier parts of the arbitral process. In the award, the 
tribunal evaluates these aspects of dispute and draws them together into a holistic conclusion.  
These elements are the essence and ultimate product of an arbitration. Policy discussions 
concerning the value of transparency in investment arbitration focus heavily on transparency of 
the arbitral outcome, evidencing the significance of these two features. 
UNCITRAL adopted the Rules on Transparency in 2013, some 37 years after the 
organization drafted the Rules. The Rules on Transparency are expressly drafted to 
apply only in certain situations, all of which require express or implied party 
consent (namely, through expressly agreeing to application of the rules or by 
accepting to be bound by a treaty which imports the rules). Article 25(4) provides 
that “[h]earings shall be held in camera, unless the parties agree otherwise,” and 
Article 32(5) provides that “[t]he award may be made public only with the consent 
of both parties.”16 
Other institutes also have similar rules. For example, the ICSID Rules provide that “[u]nless either 
party objects, the Tribunal, after consultation with the Secretary-General, may allow other persons, 
besides the parties, their agents, counsel and advocates, witnesses and experts during their 
testimony, and officers of the Tribunal, to attend or observe all or part of the hearings.”17 The 
ICSID Rules state that the award will only be published with the consent of the parties. 
The American Arbitration Association (AAA) International Arbitration Rules under 
Article 34 state that “confidential information disclosed during the proceedings by the parties or 
witnesses shall not be divulged by an arbitrator.”18 
 
16 G.A. Res.31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976). 
17 ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), 2006, Rule 32(2). 
18 The American Arbitration Association, International Arbitration Rules, Art. 34 (Nov. 1, 2000). 
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In relation to awards, the LCIA Rules provide that “[t]he LCIA does not publish any award 
or any part of an award without the prior written consent of all parties and the Arbitral Tribunal.”19 
 
(A summary of Rules of Transparency is mentioned in the following table) 
S. No. International Arbitration 
Rules  
Provision  
1 UNCITRAL Rules Article 34.5: Award may be made public if 
all parties consent or in other limited 
circumstances 
2 ICSID Rules Rules 32, 37, and 48 
3 LCIA Rules Article 30: Awards and any materials in 
proceedings are confidential; disclosure is 
permitted in limited circumstances 
4 ICC Rules Article 22.3: Any party can apply for 
confidentiality of proceedings, or to protect 
trade secrets or confidential information 
5 CIETAC Rules  Article 38: In private hearings, all parties 
have obligation not to disclose any matters 
relating to the case. Parties can request 
open hearing.  
6 SIAC Rules  Rule 39: All matters relating to proceedings 
and award, disclosure is permitted in 
limited circumstances  
 
19 LCIA Arbitration Rules, art. 30.3 (Oct. 1, 2014). 
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7 HKIAC Rules  Article 42: Awards and any information 
about the arbitration, disclosure is 
permitted in limited circumstances 
8 SCC Rules Article 46: SCC and tribunal maintain 
confidentiality of arbitration and award, 
unless otherwise agreed by parties 
 
Under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Arbitration Rules, 
some level of transparency is available to investors. As per the ICSID Arbitration Rules, interested 
third parties may intervene in arbitral proceedings, at the discretion of the tribunal.20The ICSID 
does not publish the award without the consent of the parties, but it is required 
to “promptly” include in its publication “excerpts of the legal reasoning” of the Tribunal.21 
The provisions on the confidentiality of both hearings and awards in the ICSID Rules are 
weighted very much in favor of openness and transparency. The hearings are presumed to be 
capable of being public, unless a party objects, and the publication of the award is only addressed 
in connection with publication by the ICSID (imposing no restrictions on publication by the parties 
themselves). There is, therefore, a distinctly different starting point when considering 
confidentiality in the context of the ICSID Rules, which are weighted in favor of openness and 
transparency, as compared to the UNCITRAL Rules, which are expressly framed to preserve 
confidentiality over the core parts of the arbitration unless the parties agree otherwise. 
An UNCITRAL Rule provides for public access to key documents prepared during the 
course of proceedings22 (including parties’ submissions), except in limited instances where it is 
paramount to protect confidential or protected information. It is pertinent to note that because India 
 
20See Rule 37 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, available at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/2006%20CRR_English-final.pdf,(Last Modified 10/11/2107). 
21See Rule 48 of the ICSID. 
22 The Mauritius Convention on Transparency: Comments on the treaty and its role in increasing transparency of 
investor-State arbitration, available at:http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/08/Mauritius-Convention-Transparency-
Paper-formatted-FINAL.pdf , (Last Modified 10/11/2107). 
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is not a party to the ICSID Convention, none of the cases decided by the ICSID Tribunal are 
applicable to investment arbitration involving India. Thus, the UNCITRAL Rule (and specifically 
the Mauritius Convention on Transparency) concerning the public access to key documents 
prepared during the course of the arbitral proceedings will contribute to the development of a new 
set of jurisprudence under the India related BITs. 
The ICSID tribunal in Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v. Tanzania,23 commented on the 
nature of confidential duty under the UNCITRAL Rules. It observed that, apart from Articles 25(4) 
and 32(5), the Rules contain no other provisions expressly imposing a general duty of 
confidentiality or prohibiting disclosure of documents prepared for or disclosed in the arbitration. 
The general duty of confidentiality is not absolute and depends on the nature of the proceedings, 
whether it is a commercial arbitration or it arises from a treaty agreement.24 
In Loewen Group, Inc v. United States of America,25 the tribunal (which was operating 
under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, which, like the UNCITRAL Rules, contains no express 
provisions on the confidentiality of the arbitration) observed that it had “rejected the Claimant’s 
submission that each party is under a general obligation of confidentiality in relation to the 
proceedings.” 
In SD Myers, Inc v. Canada26 the UNCITRAL tribunal observed that the general principles 
of confidentiality exist in a commercial arbitration agreement but not in an arbitration pursuant to 
the provisions in an International treaty. This is because a public interest component is involved 
in an investment arbitration.27 
The Tribunal considers that, whatever may be the position in private consensual 
arbitrations between commercial parties, it has not been established that any general 
principle of confidentiality exists in an arbitration such as that currently before this 
 
23Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v Tanzania (ICSID Case No ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No 3of 29 September 
2006), para. 132. 
 
24Id. 
25Loewen Group, Inc v United States of America (ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/98/3, Decision on Jurisdiction of 5 
January 2001), para. 26. 
26SD Myers Inc v Canada (Procedural Order No 16 of 13 May 2000). 
27Philip Morris Asia Ltd v Australia (Procedural Order No 5 of 30 November 2012). 
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tribunal. The main argument in favour of confidentiality is founded on a supposed 
implied term in the arbitration agreement. The present arbitration is taking place 
pursuant to a provision in an international treaty, not pursuant to an arbitration 
agreement between disputing parties.28 
And more recently, the UNCITRAL tribunal in Philip Morris Asia Ltd v. Australia29 – an 
investment arbitration which was also seated in Singapore – observed that:   
The Tribunal is aware that, while confidentiality is a traditional and an essential 
feature of commercial arbitration in many jurisdictions, in investment arbitration 
the practice is much more diversified. This practice recognizes that investment 
disputes involve a public interest component which suggests that information about 
the dispute be made available not only to parties and the tribunal but also to civil 
society at large.  This recognition has led to a growing practice – under the various 
rules chosen for investment arbitration – to provide for greater transparency.  
Evidence for such a move toward transparency is found in investment treaties, 
modern procedural rules and rulings of arbitral tribunals. Such considerations also 
apply in the present dispute. . . . In this regard, the Tribunal has taken into account 
the extensive arguments raised by the Parties in favour or against the confidentiality 
and transparency of certain aspects of the present procedure. At the same time, the 
Tribunal is mindful that the arbitral process must remain manageable, that the 
Parties’ due process rights must be safeguarded, and that confidential and sensitive 
information must be protected. This order seeks to strike a fair balance between 
transparency and these sometimes conflicting imperatives.30 
The UNCITRAL Rules do not prescribe a regime of absolute confidentiality. It is correct that the 
position on confidentiality is expressly addressed in the UNCITRAL Rules in only limited ways. 
However, it is a simplistic reading of these rules that views these express provisions in isolation 
and as providing no comprehensive guidance as to confidentiality. 
 
28Supra 31, para. 8. 
29Supra 32. 
30Supra note 32, para. 51. 
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In addressing confidentiality of the hearing and the award, confidentiality and transparency 
are not equally weighted. The starting point is a presumptive attachment of confidentiality to the 
hearing and to the Award. There may be a departure from this starting position of confidentiality, 
but this can only occur with the consent of the parties. 
While party consent is a critical feature of all of these provisions, there is an important 
distinction, in principle, between confidentiality and the other provisions. Publication will not 
happen unless the parties consent to depart from the confidentiality default. Thus, to seek to apply 
the UNCITRAL Rules in the absence of this consent, on the basis that they represent the norm, is 
misguided. 
The Rules on Transparency are clearly intended to be a step forward in this area, not the 
default position under the UNCITRAL Rules, and one which (given the nature of the implications 
for the parties to an arbitration in which the Rules on Transparency are applied) requires some 
form of agreement by the parties to their application in order to allow the departure from this 
default position. Indeed, the fact that a special set of rules was created regarding transparency, 
which is expressly not incorporated unless the parties agree, makes it clear that there is no default 
transparency under the various Rules. If transparency of this scope and nature was already the 
norm or the accepted standard in investment arbitration, there would not have been any need for 
the Rules on Transparency to have been drafted and adopted in the first place. 
In AAY v. AAZ,31 it was held that there is an exception to the general principle of 
confidentiality where disclosure of information is reasonably necessary for the protection of the 
legitimate interests of an arbitration party. 
64. In sum, an examination of exceptions to confidentiality would probably still 
begin with a reference to the established categories, taking into account the context 
and circumstances of the case, including the nature of the document(s) sought to be 
disclosed, to whom disclosure is sought to be made, and for what purpose. 
Lawrence Collins LJ accepted at [107] [in Emmott]:  
 
31AAY v AAZ [2010] SGHC 350, available at:http://www.singaporelaw.sg/sglaw/laws-of-singapore/case-law/free-
law/high-court-judgments/14402-aay-and-others-v-aaz-2010-sghc-350, (Last Modified 10/11/2017). 
 159 
 
On the authorities as they now stand, the principal cases in which 
disclosure will be permissible are these: the first is where there is 
consent, express or implied; second, where there is an order, or leave 
of the court (but that does not mean that the court has a general 
discretion to lift the obligation of confidentiality); third, where it is 
reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of 
an arbitration party; fourth, where the interests of justice require 
disclosure, and also (perhaps) where the public interest requires 
disclosure.32 
Therefore, while the UNCITRAL Rules are silent as to an express general duty of confidentiality, 
the only implicit confidentiality rules are in favor of confidentiality, placing a premium on party 
consent. The absence of other provisions expressly addressing confidentiality must be interpreted 
against the indications that are in fact expressly contained in the UNCITRAL Rules, and the silence 
with regard to a general duty of confidentiality must be interpreted in light of what is in fact 
manifest. While the UNCITRAL Rules do not contain extensive detail regarding the 
confidentiality attaching to proceedings, what limited detail they do contain is unmistakably in 
support of confidentiality being the starting point, from which the parties may depart only by 
mutual agreement. The fact that there are no provisions expressly imposing a general duty of 
confidentiality in the UNCITRAL Rules does not mean that UNCITRAL arbitrations are non-
confidential. 
It is therefore incorrect to represent the UNCITRAL Rules as providing no guidance as to 
how confidentiality in the arbitral process generally should be addressed. The implicit and logical 
starting point must be that, as with the Award and the hearing, the other materials associated with 
the arbitration are confidential unless the parties agree otherwise. Any other interpretation is 
distinctly at odds with the express inclusion of the confidentiality of the Award and the hearing, 
and would not give effect to the spirit of the rules that privileges the starting position of default 
confidentiality except where abrogated by mutual party consent. 
 
32 Ibid, paragraph 64. 
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After 2014, there was a slight change. The position of transparency rules being a norm or 
an exception is now determined by date of conclusion of treaties. Rules on Transparency are now 
the default position for UNCITRAL arbitration under investment treaties concluded on or after 1 
April 2014, unless the parties agree otherwise. They may in time become the accepted standard 
for investment treaties more broadly. 
B. The Tribunal’s Powers to Define the Appropriate Transparency Regime 
In fact, the tribunal has broad powers under Article 15 of the UNCITRAL Rules which 
include the power to decide on an appropriate transparency regime for the arbitration.33 
Article 15:  
Subject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such 
manner as it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with 
equality and that at any stage of the proceedings each party is given a full 
opportunity of presenting his case.34 
David Caron and Lee Caplan observed Article 15 “reflects the procedural flexibility which is 
generally regarded as one of the main advantages of arbitration,” and “Tribunal practice evidences 
the wide application of this authority.”35 
Article 15(1) must not be seen as a completely unfettered or absolute power for the Tribunal 
to make orders on any issue:   
[T]he ostensibly wide discretion of the arbitrators is subject to certain limitations; 
some follow directly from Article 15(1), while others flow from other provisions in 
 
33 Michael Hwang and Nicholas Thio, A Proposed Model Procedural Order on Confidentiality in 
International Arbitration: A Comprehensive and Self-Governing Code, p. 159, p. 171, (Michael Hwang, Selected 
Essays on International Arbitration (2013). 
 
34Article 15 UNCITRAL Rules. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Art. 15(1) G.A. Res. 31/98, at 11-12 (Dec. 15, 
1976) (amended as UNCIRAL Arbitration Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, G.A. 
Res. 68/109, at 1 (Dec. 16, 2013)).  
35 David Caron &Lee Caplan, The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: A Commentary 30 (Oxford Univ. Press 2nd ed., 
2013).   
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the Rules. First, the freedom of the arbitral tribunal is “[s]ubject to these Rules,” 
i.e. limited by the more specific provisions of the UNCITRAL Rules . . . the 
UNCITRAL Rules in many cases only provide a framework for the exercise of 
arbitral discretion . . . In other cases, the Rules provide almost no structure at all 
and it is incumbent upon the arbitrators to develop the particulars in accordance 
with the general principle enunciated in Article 15(1). For example, the question of 
whether a tribunal applying the Rules has the power to accept amicus submissions 
from third parties arose in the Methanex and UPS cases. In both cases, it was found 
that allowing third parties to make amicus submissions fell within the tribunal's 
powers over the conduct of the arbitration under Article 15(1). Whenever the Rules 
impose more definite limitations on arbitral discretion these should be taken into 
account. A major departure from them could provide a ground for setting aside the 
award or endanger an award's enforceability under the New York Convention.36 
Thus, in Methanex v. United States,37 the tribunal considered its power to accept amicus curiae 
submissions in the absence of express provisions dealing with that question in the Rules.  It held 
that:  
[T]he Tribunal’s powers in this respect must be inferred, if at all, from its more 
general procedural powers.  In the Tribunal’s view, the Petitioners’ requests must 
be considered against Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, and it is 
not possible nor appropriate to look elsewhere for any broader power or 
jurisdiction. . . . Article 15(1) is intended to provide the broadest procedural 
flexibility within fundamental safeguards, to be applied by the arbitration tribunal 
to fit the particular needs of the particular arbitration.38 
The tribunal in Methanex concluded that Article 15(1) gave it the power to accept amicus curiae 
submissions. 
 
36 Ibid, page 27. 
37Methanex Corporation v United States of America, ITA Inv. Treaty Cases, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions 
From Third Persons To Intervene as “Amici Curiae”, (Veeder) (Jan. 15, 2001), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0517_0.pdf. (International Arbitration under NAFTA 
and UNCITRAL Rules). 
38 Ibid, ¶. 25-27.    
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The same conclusion was reached by the UNCITRAL tribunal in United Parcel Service of 
America, Inc. v. Canada.39 In that case, the tribunal described Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL 
Rules as “[giving] the arbitral tribunal power to conduct the arbitration in an appropriate 
manner.”40 The tribunal expressed the following view: “[t]hat power is essential to the very process 
of dispute settlement by way of arbitration and might be thought to be inherent even if not 
expressly stated.”41 It follows from the above that Article 15(1) provides the Tribunal with a broad 
power over procedural issues and that this power is understood to confer “the broadest procedural 
flexibility” subject to compliance with fundamental safeguards. 
In addition to its powers under Article 15(1), the Tribunal also possesses inherent powers which it 
can exercise to fulfil its functions in the settlement of the dispute and the proper administration of 
international justice. As the ICSID tribunal in Hrvatska Elektroprivreda v. Slovenia42 explained in 
the context of an application that counsel be excluded from the case: 
[A]s a judicial formation governed by public international law, the Tribunal has an 
inherent power to take measures to preserve the integrity of its proceedings. In part, 
that inherent power finds a textual foothold in Article 44 of the Convention, which 
authorises the Tribunal to decide ‘any question of procedure’ not expressly dealt 
with in the Convention, the ICSID Arbitration Rules or ‘any rule agreed by the 
parties.’  More broadly, there is an ‘inherent power of an international court to deal 
with any issues necessary for the conduct of matters falling within its jurisdiction’; 
that power ‘exists independently of any statutory reference’. In the specific 
circumstances of the present case, it is in the Tribunal’s view both necessary and 
appropriate to take action under its inherent power.43 
 
39United Parcel Service of America, Inc v Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/02/1, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, ¶ 38  (Oct. 17 2001). 
40Ibid.  
41United Parcel Service of America, Inc v Canada,ICSID Case No. UNCT/02/1, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, ¶ 38  (Oct. 17 2001). 
42Hrvatska Elektroprivreda v Slovenia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, Order Concerning the Participation of Counsel, 
¶ 33 (May 6, 2008). 
43 Ibid. 
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To similar effect, the ICSID tribunal in Libananco Holdings Co Ltd v. Turkey44 observed that it 
did not doubt “for a moment” that “like any other international tribunal, it must be regarded as 
endowed with the inherent powers required to preserve the integrity of its own process.” 
The Tribunal’s broad powers under Article 15 of the UNCITRAL Rules, as well as its 
inherent powers, include the power to decide on an appropriate transparency regime for the 
arbitration, subject only to the two express provisions on confidentiality contained in the 
UNCITRAL Rules and noted above.  
It is generally accepted that the procedural jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal 
extends to all matters in connection with the reference to arbitrate, i.e., every 
arbitral tribunal has the inherent power to govern the manner in which the 
arbitration is conducted. It is therefore only a logical extension (and application) of 
this principle that the arbitral tribunal should be able to lay down rules governing 
(at least for the duration of the arbitration) the regime of disclosure to third parties.45 
It is pertinent to note that a tribunal cannot have an inherent power to do something that would be 
inconsistent (including implicitly) with the instrument under which that tribunal is constituted. For 
example, the tribunal in Heathrow Airport User Charges46 held that its inherent powers did not 
extend to revisiting an award it had rendered. The tribunal's Rules of Procedure expressly provided 
for re-opening proceedings only before the award had been rendered, stating “the Tribunal cannot 
exercise any power the existence of which is inconsistent with the terms of the Parties’ agreement 
as a result of which alone the Tribunal has any being.”  
Similarly, in the case of Perenco Ecuador limited v. The Republic of Ecuador,47 the tribunal 
rejected the proposition that it had an inherent power to reconsider its own decisions, on the basis 
that this would be inconsistent with the existing guidance, stating “[t]he clear structure of the 
 
44Libananco Holdings Co Ltd v Turkey, ICSID Case No ARB/06/8, Decision on Preliminary Issues, ¶ 78 (Jun. 23, 
2008). 
45See supra 38. 
46Heathrow Airport User Charges 102 ILR 564 (US-UK, 1993), Annex to Decision No. 23 of the Tribunal 
(Supplementary Decisions and Clarifications), 1 November 1993, paragraph 2.26. 
47Perenco Ecuador limited v. The Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/08/6, Decision on Ecuador's 
Reconsideration Motion, 10 April 2015, paragraph 80. 
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Convention and the Arbitration Rules cannot be overridden by a general appeal to inherent 
powers.” 
In the Hrvatska48 and Libananco49 cases, the tribunals were acting to directly preserve the 
integrity of their own processes and not to radically and actively alter the nature of the arbitration 
at the request of one of the parties on a matter which should, as a matter of principle, require mutual 
party consent. The stipulations in Article 25(4) constitute an absolute fetter on transparency over 
the hearings, absent express agreement, thereby precluding reaching out to inherent powers to, 
inter alia, require the publication of witness statements and other documents equivalent to the 
content of the hearing. 
Hrvatska was a case under the ICSID Rules and was an application to exclude counsel 
from the case, namely a matter on which the ICSID Rules were silent (as opposed to this case, 
where the UNCITRAL Rules already address the issue of confidentiality). In the quotation 
referenced by the Respondent, the tribunal stated that “there is an ‘inherent power of an 
international court to deal with any issues necessary for the conduct of matters falling within its 
jurisdiction50.’” 
In Libananco, it was held that “among the principles affected are: basic procedural fairness, 
respect for confidentiality and legal privilege (and indeed for the immunities accorded to parties, 
their counsel, and witnesses under Articles 21 and 22 of the ICSID Convention); the right of parties 
both to seek advice and to advance their respective cases freely and without interference51.” 
The capacity of the Tribunal to impose the Transparency Regime in reliance on Article 
15(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules is concerned with “the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction to hold (even 
against one party's wishes) that such matters will be confidential upon such terms as the arbitral 
tribunal sees fit.”52 In other words, this quotation is discussing a tribunal's capacity to decide on 
the terms of the confidentiality that applies to an arbitration, working from the starting point that 
 
48See supra 42. 
49See supra 44. 
50 See supra 42. 
51  See supra 44. 
52See supra 38, paragraph 8. 
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such confidentiality should apply. It should not be relied on in support of the much more radical 
proposition: that the Tribunal can actively impose a regime of total transparency. This is far from 
the Tribunal making an order permitting limited and specific departures from the confidentiality 
of the arbitration, where confidentiality is founded in the applicable rules and procedural law. 
Similarly, in EDF v. Romania,53 the tribunal's order was expressly directed at preventing 
the disclosure of party submissions and other arbitration materials so as to preserve their 
confidentiality and protect the proper conduct of the arbitration. 
In AAY v. AAZ the tribunal held that: 
54. It thus appears that the discussion has come almost a full circle, the obligation 
[of confidentiality] having been characterised in turn as an implied term based on 
custom or the officious bystander test, then as an implied term in law, and finally 
as a substantive rule of arbitration law masquerading as an implied term. . . . 
 55. In summary, therefore, I would characterise the obligation of confidentiality in 
arbitration as a doctrine of arbitration law developed through the common law 
rather than the wider corpus of international arbitration law. . . . Thus as a principle 
of arbitration law at least in Singapore and England, the obligation of 
confidentiality in arbitration will apply as a default to arbitrations where the parties 
have not specified expressly the private and/or confidential nature of the arbitration. 
While parties anticipating international arbitration would remain well advised to 
agree prospectively on the obligation of confidentiality, there is no need to do so 
where Singapore is to be the seat of the arbitration because confidentiality will 
apply as a substantive rule of arbitration law54 
Therefore, a general obligation of confidentiality applies by default to cases where the seat is in 
London or Singapore. As a result, whatever the general scope of the Tribunal's power under Article 
15(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules, it should not be exercised to impose a Transparency Regime 
against the general principle of confidentiality in arbitration in Singapore. 
 
53EDF (Services) Limited v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Procedural Order No. 2, 30 May 2008. 
54See supra 36, paragraph 54 and 55. 
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As such, the Tribunal's ability to make orders pursuant to Article 15(1) must be read subject 
to the rest of the UNCITRAL Rules, including those which presume that the core aspects of the 
arbitration will be confidential unless the parties agree otherwise. It cannot be that the Tribunal is 
empowered to impose an extensive Transparency Regime on the sole basis of this general power. 
Similarly, Caron and Caplan note an additional constraint:  
A fourth basic limitation to be taken into account in the application of Article 15(1) 
follows from Article 1(2). It provides that the UNCITRAL Rules (whether intended 
to apply as such or in a version modified by the parties) prevail only to the extent 
that they are not “in conflict with a provision of the law applicable to the arbitration 
from which the parties cannot agree to derogate.” This means, on the one hand, that 
the parties cannot agree to modifications which are in conflict with mandatory 
provisions of the law applicable to the arbitration, nor is it possible for the 
arbitrators to derogate from such provisions. On the other hand, the combined effect 
of Articles 15(1) and 1(2) is that “a choice of the UNCITRAL Rules is to be 
understood as an exclusion of all national arbitration law, except for its mandatory 
provisions.” In other words, unless the parties have agreed to abide by a given law, 
or the arbitral tribunal has decided, in accordance with Article 15(1), to apply 
procedural norms of a designated national law, the arbitrators are not obliged to 
follow any domestic law in solving procedural problems not covered by the 
UNCITRAL Rules. They must, however, ensure that the mandatory norms of “the 
law applicable to the arbitration” are not circumvented.55 
Thus, the starting point in common law arbitrations (at least in England and Singapore) is 
confidentiality and the appropriate circumstances in which to depart from that confidentiality. 
Caron and Caplan expounded on this by stating:   
It is well-established that at common law (at least in England and Singapore), there 
is an implied duty of confidentiality. The problem is not so much in defining the 
obligation of confidentiality in arbitration itself, but rather in defining the 
 
55 Caron and Caplan, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 30 and 31 (1st edition). 
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exceptions to that duty of confidentiality where such a duty is recognized by the 
law of the seat of arbitration.56 
In discussing how to address these exceptions, Michael Hwang and Katie Chung’s article57 
recommends the application of a procedural order by the tribunal that is adapted to the 
circumstances of each arbitration, the starting point of which is confidentiality:   
The order should provide for a blanket rule of confidentiality but allow parties to 
apply to the tribunal for an exception to or modification of that rule depending on 
the circumstances of the case, with a fall back to the court should the tribunal be 
unable to act. . . . This would, in effect, allow the tribunal to work as a common law 
court to develop sensible and fair exceptions to the blanket rule.58 
Thus, tribunals which have exercised their inherent powers in relation to issues of confidentiality 
and transparency, have done so in a manner that protects and preserves the integrity of the arbitral 
process. 
The principles laid down in Biwater Gauff59 and the dissection of confidentiality 
requirements into different categorizations in that case are of relevance, particularly in view of the 
requirement to safeguard and preserve the fundamental integrity of the arbitration process. Reliefs, 
in the form of restrictions, were granted in the following way:  
(a) [A]s to “general discussion about the case,” this was permitted, with the 
overriding requirement that such a discussion was "not used as an instrument to 
further antagonize the parties, exacerbate their differences, unduly pressure one of 
them, or render the resolution of the dispute potentially more difficult";60 
 
56 Supra note 38, paragraph 2 (a). 
57 Michael Hwang and Katie Chung, Defining the Indefinable: Practical Problems of Confidentiality in Arbitration, 
(Michael Hwang, Selected Essays on International Arbitration, 2013). 
58 Ibid, Paragraph 94(b) and (c). 
59Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v Tanzania (ICSID Case No ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No 3 
of 29 September 2006), para. 132. 
 
60 Id., paragraph 149. 
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(b) [A]s to publication of “Decisions, Orders and Directions of the Tribunal” 
(excluding the award, which was consensually agreed to be put into the public 
domain), it was directed that this would be considered on a case-by-case basis;61 
(c) [A]s to “Minutes or Records of Hearings,” it was found that these have the 
potential to affect the procedural integrity and efficiency of the hearing itself, and 
based thereon, it was again directed that this would be considered on a case-by-case 
basis;62 
(d) [A]s to “Documents Disclosed in the Proceedings,” unilateral disclosure by a 
party of documents produced by it in the arbitration proceedings was found 
permissible. However, documents produced by the opposing party were held to be 
liable to be treated as bound by confidentiality, whether produced through a 
disclosure request or otherwise, since the presumption was that these materials were 
liable to be disclosed only for such purpose;63 
(e) [A]s to “Pleadings/Written Memorials,” witness statements and expert reports, 
they were found to fall within the restricted category, such that these should not be 
disclosed during the pendency of the arbitration;64 and  
(f) [A]s to “Correspondence Between the Parties and/or the Arbitral Tribunal 
exchanged in respect of the Arbitral Proceedings,” again, this was a category where 
it was found that the need for transparency (if any) was outweighed by the 
requirements of procedural integrity; it was found that these did not warrant wider 
distribution.65 
 
 
61 Id., paragraph 153. 
62 Id., paragraph 155. 
63Id., paragraphs 156 and 157. 
64Id., paragraphs 158 and 159. 
65 Id., paragraph 161. 
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C. Risks of the Transparency Regiment  
Redfern and Hunter conclude that the fact that the hearing is to be confidential is sufficient 
basis to find a related form of confidentiality attaching to the materials associated with that hearing, 
so as to give proper effect to the express confidentiality provision: 
[I]f the hearing is to be held in private, it would seem to follow that the documents 
disclosed and the evidence given at that hearing should also be – and should remain 
– private. In principle, there would seem to be no point in excluding non-
participants from an arbitration hearing if they can later read all about it in printed 
articles or on an authorised website.66 
A similar conclusion was reached by the tribunal in SD Myers, Inc v. Canada.67The tribunal 
specifically considered the scope of Article 25(4) (i.e. hearings to be held in camera unless the 
parties agree otherwise) and whether it imports a broader implied duty of confidentiality. By 
Procedural Order No. 16 issued on May 13 2000, dealing with confidentiality applicable to written 
evidence-in-chief (i.e. witness statements), written opening submissions and trial exhibits in a 
context where the hearing was to be confidential, the tribunal stated that:  
It would be artificial and might adversely affect the efficient organisation of . . . 
arbitration proceedings if such materials [i.e. witness statements, written opening 
submissions and trial exhibits] were to be deemed to be less private merely because 
they were to be delivered in advance of an oral hearing, or even after it in the form 
of post-hearing briefs. Such written materials effectively form part of the hearing. 
The same level of confidentiality that is conferred on the transcripts of the opening 
and closing submissions and witness testimony logically be applied to equivalent 
written materials. It would ‘drive a coach and horses’ through Article 25.4 of the 
Rules if any other conclusion were to be reached. . . . Furthermore, Article 25.4 is 
written in mandatory terms. . . . A close examination of the manner in which Section 
III of the Rules was crafted reveals that the drafters had the distinction between 
 
66  Nigel Blackaby and Constantine Partasides QC with Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on 
International Arbitration (6th edition, 2015), para 2.164. 
67SD Myers Inc v Canada (Procedural Order No 16 of 13 May 2000). 
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mandatory and permissive terminology well in mind. Accordingly, the Tribunal 
takes the view that it has no authority to derogate from the provision contained in 
Article 25.4 in the absence of agreement between the parties.68 
The tribunals have in fact held that there is an implied duty of confidentiality in the ICC Rules, 
which (similarly to the UNCITRAL Rules) address confidentiality only in relation to hearings and 
awards.  In the Award in Unidentified ICC Case, quoted by Born in his book called International 
Arbitration: Law and Practice,69 the tribunal held that: 
While the confidentiality of ICC arbitral proceedings is not mentioned in the ICC 
Rules . . . as a matter of principle, arbitration proceedings have a confidential 
character which must be respected by everyone who participates in such 
proceedings.70 
The International Law Association Report on Confidentiality in International Commercial 
Arbitration commented that in many instances the reason institutional rules, including the 
UNCITRAL Rules, are silent on the broader issue of confidentiality is due to “a conscious choice 
when drafting the Rules to avoid the regulation of this issue due to the difficulties in reaching 
agreement on an appropriate formulation for a general duty of confidentiality and any list of 
exceptions.”71 
Many commentators cast doubt on the assertions that investment arbitration must be treated 
differently from commercial arbitration with regard to the parties' entitlement to confidentiality. 
Born addresses this issue by stating:  
[I]t is unclear why investor-state arbitrations require (or would benefit from) more 
extensive “transparency.” Publication of pleadings, other written submissions, 
transcripts and evidentiary submissions might produce more detailed public 
awareness of particular issues, but it is very hard to see how this would materially 
 
68SD Myers Inc v Canada (Procedural Order No 16 of 13 May 2000). paragraphs 12 and 13. 
69 Gary B. Born, International Arbitration: Law and Practice (2d ed. 2016). 
70 Gary B. Born, International Arbitration: Law and Practice 205-6 (2d ed. 2016), section 10.03. In quoting this 
case, Born notes that "[d]espite the limited scope of confidentiality provisions in the ICC Rules, tribunals have 
generally concluded that ICC arbitrations are impliedly confidential" (section 10.03, page 205). 
71 International Law Association, “Confidentiality in International Arbitration”, Report for the Hague Conference 
10 & 11 (2010). 
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assist a state in asserting (or defending) its interests nor in explaining its policies to 
the public. Equally, proponents of reduced confidentiality in investor-state 
arbitrations do not explain why greater transparency is more appropriate in the 
dispute resolution context than in the contract or treaty negotiation and diplomatic 
contexts – where confidentiality is, for good reason, the rule. In fact, the same 
considerations that counsel in favor of confidentiality in forming investor-state 
agreements – building trust and objectivity, preserving commercial and other 
confidences, facilitating the negotiation process, avoiding inflammation of 
emotions – also counsel in favor of confidentiality in the dispute resolution 
context.72 
 
1. Risk of misuse of information  
The parties often fear that the disclosure of its pleadings or applications and any 
confidential information contained therein or the documents which support its pleadings or 
applications would compromise its interests. The information and documentation often 
carry legally and financially sensitive information (i.e. sensitive to the operation of the 
business of the parties) with regard to which they may have apprehensions about it entering 
public domain. 
The information may be used to fuel public interest litigations in India, to disrupt 
the arbitral process through generating unwarranted opprobrium vis-à-vis the parties, based 
on distortion of information and corollary but unfounded negative perceptions. Non-
governmental organization (NGO) activism is present in India, and is often highlighted as 
a first rung of risk to any potential foreign investor. There are multiple instances within the 
public domain of foreign investors having been precluded from entering India or having 
been driven away by ostensible NGO-run campaigns. A competitor, armed with 
documentary material placed before a Tribunal under the Transparency Regime, would 
have magnified insight into these arbitration proceedings and would thus acquire 
 
72 Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration: Volume II International Arbitral Procedures 2830, 2832 (2d 
ed. 2014). 
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heightened ability to cause harm to the parties, including finding ways to delay or 
jeopardize the arbitration proceedings. The non-inclusion of Articles 4 and 5 of the Rules 
on Transparency in the Transparency Regime would not prevent real or ostensible activism 
outside of the strict spectrum of the arbitration, and the Tribunal would be incapable of 
obviating or even controlling the myriad pressures on the parties, whether directly or 
through its India-based affiliates, as a result of the imposition of a Transparency Regime.  
By way of example, the “Monsanto Quit India” campaign was launched against the 
foreign investor Monsanto, a multinational agrochemical and agricultural biotechnology 
corporation, in response to its acquisition of the largest Indian seed company by Monsanto 
in May 1998. In 1999, the Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology, 
headed by Vandana Shiva, an environmental activist, filed a public interest litigation 
against Monsanto, in the Supreme Court to bring the “bio-terrorism of bio-technology 
companies” to the notice of the court and to seek protection of the environment, and 
ecological and economic security of farmers.73 
A more recent example, in 2014, Mr. Bishwajit Bhattacharya, moved a public 
interest litigation74 before the Supreme Court of India against Vodafone International 
Holdings B.V. to recover the tax due, by enforcing the retrospective amendments to the 
Indian Income-tax Act, as well as to restrain the Dutch company from proceeding with 
arbitration under the India-Netherlands BIT. 
2. Adverse impact of transparency on document production process and 
witnesses  
The imposition of a Transparency Regime is likely to influence a party's decisions 
of going forward as to matters of disclosure of material matters, and in particular as to 
 
73 Monsanto vs Indian Farmers, available at: http://vandanashiva.com/?p=402, (Last Modified 10/11/2107). 
74Prabhash Ranjan, As India’s New Bilateral Investment Strategy Sputters out, the Secrecy and Opaqueness Must 
Go, available at:https://thewire.in/130524/bits-investment-strategy-failure/ , (Last Modified 10/11/2107). 
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production of documents (especially when it concerns documents that may carry legal or 
financial sensitivities) and the evidence that witnesses are comfortable giving.  
The implementation of the Transparency Regime risks stultifying full, frank, and 
free disclosure of material information to the Tribunal where the party is at risk of such 
material then being put into public domain. In such circumstances, while the party will of 
course comply with its obligations with respect to the production of documents. However, 
where there is no strict requirement for a document to be produced, the party will be 
required to weigh the risk of third parties (oft-influenced by competitors) misusing any 
such material before placing any such material on the record.    
3. Practical difficulties of Transparency Regime – multiple applications, costs 
and delays involving redaction of sensitive sections  
The fact that a series of sensitive pleadings and supporting documents will form the 
record of the Tribunal is indisputable. Whether these sensitivities stem from legal, 
financial, or business matters, confidentiality is vital. Should any limited form of disclosure 
be permitted, not only would the process of segregating material that ought to be made 
available in the public domain become cumbersome, but additionally, it puts the parties at 
risk of multiple procedural hearings concerning the appropriate limits of disclosure in the 
Transparency Regime, delays and substantial costs. The quintessential requirements 
underpinning any Transparency Regime are that these shall not disrupt or unduly burden 
the arbitral proceedings, or unfairly prejudice any disputing party. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A dispute must be adjudicated free of external pressures, and all steps must be taken to 
ensure that the remedy is not compromised. There are multiple instances within the public domain 
of foreign investors being precluded from entering India or being driven away by ostensible NGO-
run campaigns. The competitors, equipped with documentary material placed before Tribunals 
under the Transparency Regime, would have magnified insight into arbitration proceedings. Thus, 
the competitors would acquire a heightened ability to cause harm to the parties of the arbitration, 
including finding ways to delay or jeopardize the arbitration proceedings. Tribunals would be 
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incapable of obviating or even controlling the myriad pressures on the Claimant, whether directly 
or through its India-based affiliates, as a result of the imposition of a Transparency Regime.  
Furthermore, the imposition of a Transparency Regime is likely to influence the parties’ 
decisions to proceed with matters of disclosure of material matters and the evidence from 
witnesses. Thus, the implementation of the Transparency Regime risks stultifying full, frank, and 
free disclosure of material information to the Tribunal when the Claimant is at risk of such material 
being released to public domain.75 
 With regards to the Vodafone International Holdings B.V. litigation, if the arbitral tribunal 
finds the imposition of such retrospective tax a violation of India’s obligation under the BIT, it 
will amount to an indictment of exercise of the public power of the Indian state. Furthermore, if 
the investor succeeds in a BIT claim, then the government will have to pay damages to the foreign 
investor. These damages would have to be paid from the Indian tax-payer’s money, and thus, the 
government is under an obligation to keep the Indian public informed by providing and updating 
information about these cases.76 
Thus, neither some administrative inconvenience in publishing information nor the 
possibility of an unidentified party in the future misusing information outweigh the factors 
militating in favor of transparency. This is because transparency will be subject to the relevant 
safeguards contained in the Transparency Rules, namely Article 7, which protects confidential or 
protected information from being made public.77Confidential or protected information consists of  
(a) Confidential business information;  
(b) Information that is protected against being made available to the public under 
the treaty;  
 
75Julie A. Maupin, Transparency in International Investment Law: The Good, the Bad, and the Murky, 
TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 142-171 (Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters eds., Cambridge University 
Press, 2013). 
 
76Prabhash Ranjan, supra note 75. 
77UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (2014), Art 
7(1): “Confidential or protected information, as defined in paragraph 2 and as identified pursuant to the 
arrangements referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4, shall not be made available to the public pursuant to 
articles 2 to 6.” 
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(c) Information that is protected against being made available to the public, in the 
case of the information of the respondent State, under the law of the respondent 
State, and in case of other information, under any law or rules determined by the 
arbitral tribunal to be applicable to the disclosure of such information; or  
(d) Information the disclosure of which would impede law enforcement.78 
Further, Article 7(5) provides a self-judging exception to protect against disclosure 
of information that would be contrary to essential security interests.79 Finally, there 
is also an exception to the transparency rules that permit the tribunals to restrain or 
limit disclosure when necessary to protect the “integrity of the process.”80 
The Mauritius Convention promotes public interest in transparency in treaty based investor-State 
arbitration. The publication of basic data about filed cases may increase the possibility, in the 
future, of accurately identifying both the number and types of claims being brought against 
States under investment treaties.81Awards rendered against82 (or in favor of)83  India or parties of 
Indian origin have not been made public.84The information flow and increased transparency will 
help develop perceptions as to the viable means of dispute settlement.85 
 
78UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (2014), Art 7(2). 
 
79UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (2014), Art 7(5). 
80 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (2014), Art 7(6)-(7) (a category 
under Article 7, which is intended to restrain or delay disclosure to cover exceptional circumstances, such as witness 
intimidation or comparably exceptional circumstances). 
81Esme Shirlow, A Step toward Greater Transparency: The UN Transparency Convention, KLUWER ARBITRATION 
BLOG (March 30, 2015), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/03/30/a-step-toward-greater-transparency-
the-un-transparency-convention/. 
82See White Industries v. India; Devas Multimedia v. India. 
83See Flemingo Duty Free Private Limited v. Poland 
84Prabhash Ranjan ,Transparency in Indian Investment Treaties, South Asian University, New Delhi, India, 
http://uncitralrcap.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/1.Prabhash-Ranjan.pdf,(last visited October 11, 2017). 
85Aguas Argentinas SA, Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA v. Argentine Republic, Case No. 
ARB/03/19 (ICSID) (order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae of 19 
May 2005 para. 22).  
